The Cambridge Compromise composition of the European Parliament allocates five base seats to each Member State's citizenry, and apportions the remaining seats proportionately to population figures using the divisor method with rounding upwards and observing a 96 seat capping. The power-weighted variant avoids the capping step, proceeding instead by a non-linear downweighting of the population figures until the largest State is allocated exactly 96 seats. The pertinent calculations of the variant are described, and its relative constitutional merits are discussed.
Introduction
The Cambridge Compromise "5+Upw" is a mathematical formula to apportion the 751 seats of the European Parliament (EP) among the 27 Member States, [4, 5] . It operates in two steps. In the first step, five base seats are allocated to the citizenry of each Member State. In the second step, the 616 (= 751−27·5) remaining seats are apportioned in proportion to the States' population figures 1 p 1 , . . . , p 27 . The divisor method with rounding upwards secures the minimum threshold of six seats per Member State. Seat contingents are capped at 96 if need be, staying in line with Article 14 II of the Treaty of Lisbon that decrees that no Member State shall be allocated less than 6 or more than 96 seats, [11] .
This note develops a power-weighted variant "5+Pwr+Upw" of the Cambridge Compromise, in the spirit of [1, 12] . The variant refers the apportionment of the 616 remaining seats to power-weighted population indices p E i , rather than to the original population figures p i . When necessary, an exponent E < 1 is calculated in order that the contingent of the largest Member State be reduced to exactly 96 seats.
It is shown in Section 2 that, for a given apportionment vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x 27 ), the exponent E ranges across an interval [E min (x), E max (x)] without alteration to x. We describe in Section 3 how to determine an exponent E that secures 96 seats for the largest State. Section 4 contains a discussion of the Date: September 2, 2011. 1 We find it useful to sort populations from largest to smallest. Thus p 1 refers to the largest Member State (at present, Germany), and p 27 to the smallest (at present, Malta). merits of the variant from the viewpoint of general electoral principles, and of the requirements of the Union's primary law.
The power-weighted variant stays closer to the status quo composition of the EP than do (at least) many of the other methods reviewed in [5] . It affords a possible transition from the present composition to the eventual Cambridge Compromise "5+Upw" across an enlarged Union, and it satisfies the amended definition of degressive proportionality of [5] . On the other hand, the use of power-weighted population indices entails a lack of transparency, and constitutes a breach of the principle of equal voting power.
Exponent-ranges
Suppose the seat vector x originates from population indices that are weighted with some given exponent E > 0. Since the exponent is a continuous variable while the seat contingents are integer-valued, there exists a range of values of E across which the seat vector x is constant. In this section, we investigate the induced exponent-range [E min (x), E max (x)]. The allocation of base seats plays no role in this investigation, and will therefore be neglected in this section. Similarly, we shall take no account of the 96-seat cap in this section.
The seats to be apportioned are the 616 remaining seats. Let y = y(E) be a seat apportionment vector generated with a given exponent E > 0. The components y i are obtained from the population indices p E i via scaling with a common divisor D > 0 and rounding the resulting quotients upwards, where the divisor is chosen so that the sum of the components exhausts the seats available:
For a given y, the exponent-range [E min (y), E max (y)] is calculated as follows.
We need consider only seat vectors y with y i ≥ 1 for all i. Consider two States indexed i and j. There exists a unique critical exponent E(i, j), depending on y, such that, when E = E(i, j), the allocations (y i , y j ) and (y i +1, y j −1) are equally justified. Only situations with y j ≥ 2 are relevant in order to make sure that y j − 1 ≥ 1 plus five base seats achieve the six seat minimum required by the Treaty of Lisbon.
The tie entails the identities
In view of the rule of rounding upwards, this indicates that State i may be allocated y i or y i + 1 seats, and that State j is eligible for y j − 1 or y j seats.
The identities allow us to eliminate the divisor and to solve thus for the critical exponent,
As E increases, the seat vector y is unchanged until E attains the value
By a similar argument as E decreases, the lower boundary point of the exponent-range is E min (y) = max {E(i, j) : p i < p j , y j ≥ 2} . The exponent-range for y is found to be [E min (y), E max (y)]. This range necessarily contains the given exponent E used to generate the seat vector y.
For example, consider the case of unweighted population figures, E = 1. The seat numbers x i (1) = 5 + y i (1) are exhibited in the penultimate column of Table 1 . It transpires that y(E) = y(1) is unchanged as E ranges from E min y(1) = 0.9956 to E max y(1) = 1.0010. The "nicest" value in this exponent-range is evidently E = 1.
For a general compact interval [E min , E max ], we may pick a "nice" representative exponent E by rounding the midpoint of the interval to as few significant digits as the interval permits. The smallest and greatest intervals are half-open, however. In these two intervals, we may choose a representative exponent near the closed boundary, in order to avoid numerical difficulties.
The transfer argument proves also that, if E < E ′ , the seat vector y(E) is majorized 2 by the seat vector y(E ′ ). In particular, the largest State i = 1 has seat numbers that are nondecreasing in E, that is E < E ′ ⇒ y 1 (E) ≤ y 1 (E ′ ). We have that y 1 (0.01) = 28 − 5 = 23 and y 1 (27.5) = 595 − 5 = 590, see Table 1 . Hence, the equation y 1 (E) = 91 is solvable for E. We consider the determination of a solution in the next section.
Choice of initial exponent
We may determine an exponent E with y 1 (E) = 91 in the following algorithmic manner. As starting point, we may expect the ideal share of the largest State to be close to its target contingent of 91 seats,
This equation may be solved numerically, and yields (with the 1.1.2011 Eurostat population figures) an initial exponent E init = 0.8888. The largest State i = 1 misses its target by a single seat, y 1 (0.8888) = 90. The induced exponent-range turns out to be [0.8884, 0.8977], with "nice" exponent 0.89. The machinery of Section 2 yields the next seat vector y(0.899), with exponentrange [0.8978, 0.8998], which still fails to allocate 91 seats to the largest State. One further iteration yields an exponent 0.9 ∈ [0.8999, 0.9035] with which the discrepancy vanishes. See Table 1 .
An improved initialization procedure is available. The divisor method with rounding upwards is known to be biased, in that it has a tendency on average to favour smaller States at the expense of larger States. The seat-bias of the largest State may be approximated by the formula
see [6] . With this term included, the above initialization equation becomes
with numerical solution E init = 0.9055, and hence the "nice" exponent 0.91. The ensuing seat vector y(0.91) achieves the target for the largest State, y 1 (0.91) = 91, with exponent-range [0.9036, 0.9109]. Thus y(0.91) differs from y(0.9).
We return now to the original setting in which each State receives in addition five base seats, and we write x i = 5 + y i . If an exponent lies below 0.8999 or above 0.9109, the corresponding allocation fails to allocate to the largest State its target contingent of 96 seats. The exponent-range [0.8999, 0.9035] gives rise to the feasible seat vector x(0.9), and the subsequent exponentrange [0.9036, 0.9109] yields the apportionment x(0.91). Thus we obtain two apportionment vectors, x(0.9) and x(0.91), each of which allocates 96 seats to the largest Member State. See 3 Table 1 .
As pointed out to the authors by a referee and also by Svante Janson, there are alternative ways to calculate sensible initial exponents E init , including the asymptotic bias formula of [7] . However, when implementing the procedure into the open source Augsburg software BAZI 4 we found that the naïve initialization E = 1 works very well, for all practical purposes. Practical problems 3 Exponent-ranges for E and applicable divisors D are: are of such low complexity that special initialization routines would appear redundant.
We close this section with some comments based on the current and foreseeable population profile of the European Union.
1. There can exist several values of E for which the seat vector x(E) satisfies x 1 (E) = 96. Of these, the smallest such exponent leads to the composition closest to the status quo composition and, presumably, risks the greatest acclaim of the incumbent Parliament. Similarly, the composition with the largest exponent comes closest to the principled approach of the Cambridge Compromise. See Table 2. 2. A composition based on an exponent satisfying E ≤ 1 automatically satisfies the revised definition of degressive proportionality of [5] . Conversely, when E > 1, the representation might possibly be called "progressive". A progressively proportional system is employed for the translation of votes into seats for the Estonian Riigikogu (parliament), using the divisor method with rounding downwards (Jefferson/D'Hondt/Hagenbach-Bischoff) with exponent E = 10/9.
3. The power-weighted variant is a smoother allocation in situations where the Cambridge Compromise "5+Upw" hits the upper cap. Its implementation is thus in two steps. First, calculate the CamCom apportionment. If this caps the largest State at 96, then calculate the power-weighted variant.
4. As new States accede, the exponents E that achieve x 1 (E) = 96 approach unity. When unity is reached, E = 1, the downweighting of population figures becomes neutral, and the ensuing apportionment is that of the Cambridge Compromise.
5. The identity 5+Upw = 5.5+Std = 6+Dwn ( [13] ) is invalid for non-linear variants of the Cambridge Compromise including that considered here.
6. Serious issues of transparency and interpretation arise in the use of powerweighted population indices. For example, in the composition with exponent E = 0.9, the number of (non-base) seats allocated to Italy is in proportion to a population index of 10 058 816.8 power-weighted "apportionment units", rather than to the Italian population 60 340 328. How should this be interpreted, or explained to an Italian citizen? This problem does not arise in the linear case when E = 1. In this case there is a divisor-value D = 830 000 with the clear interpretation that every group of 830 000 Union citizens accounts for one seat in Parliament (subject to rounding). Table 2 . Comparison of five EP compositions. Column A is the Cambridge Compromise "5+Upw" of [5] . Column B is the parabolic allotment of [10] . Columns C and D are power-weighted variants, with exponents 0.91 and 0.9 respectively, and associated population indices as shown. Column E is the status quo.
Discussion
The legal principles for the composition of and election to the European Parliament (EP) may be found in Article 14 of the Treaty of Lisbon [11] : The concept of electoral equality is not self-explanatory, but requires interpretation. Constitutional courts take pains to distinguish between large electorates (such as a national parliament), medium-size electorates (such as a provincial legislature), and small electorates (as in local communities). The European Union is on a scale in excess of these, and the notions of electoral equality entertained within the 27 Member States cannot be extended automatically to the entirety of the Union. The EP has thus substantial freedom in specifying an interpretation of the concept of electoral equality.
The two-stage process of the Cambridge Compromise may be interpreted as a type of "dual electoral equality". This dual concept is a merger of the one state, one vote rule of international law, and of the one person, one vote principle of equal representation of citizens. There is a potential ambiguity in the term "state" over whether it refers to government or to people. Our belief that many Members of the EP consider themselves representatives of their citizenry is supported by the statement of Article 14 II that says just this. We shall thus write here of "citizenries" rather than of "states".
The Cambridge Compromise merges the two aspects of electoral equality, and may be interpreted as follows. The base component is directed towards equality of citizenries, and the proportional allocation of the remaining seats is aimed at equality among Union citizens. In contrast, it is considerably harder to justify the power-weighted variant of the Cambridge Compromise, since it violates the principle of equal suffrage as set out by the Venice Commission:
(2.2) Equal voting power: seats must be evenly distributed between the constituencies. There seems little doubt in the context of the EP that the word "constituencies" should be interpreted as "Member States". Yet the power-weighted apportionment is decidedly unequal 5 . For example, whereas the Italian population-index accounts for just a sixth of its population, the Maltese index accounts for one quarter.
A further principle of electoral affairs, the continuity principle, shields the legislator from abstract rules in situations where more sensitive action is needed. During a period of significant institutional development, the EP may adopt the power-weighted variant 5+Pwr+Upw as a step along a continuous transition from the negotiated status quo composition to the constitutionally principled Cambridge Compromise. This variant honours the equality principle for citizenries, and converges for an enlarged Union towards the equality principle for individual citizens. The transitional period with E < 1 is justifiable by an appeal to the principle of continuity.
The above discussion may be summarised as follows. While the powerweighted variant of the Cambridge Compromise is technically sound and feasible, it is in conflict with the principle of equal voting power. Since the powerweighting will diminish as the Union grows, this variant may be justified by the continuity principle.
We close with a word of caution. The lack of transparency of the powerweighted variant may be more harmful than helpful to public reception. The current rapporteur Andrew Duff MEP has proposed an intermediate step of negotiation as a bridge between the status quo and the Cambridge Compromise. This pragmatic proposal may be superior in communication and implementation.
